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The international energy industry has made significant efforts over the last 10 years to improve 
risk management and safety performance. The industry continues to improve and increase 
emphasis on Occupational Safety and Process Safety programs in support of improving risk 
management. 
Significant increases in work in areas of organizational development will help integrate human 
factors concepts into enterprise risk management frameworks and help improve safety and 
operational performance. Key elements of organizational development, including leadership and 
culture, require involvement across the entire organization. 
The Society of Petroleum Engineers conducted several industry-wide summits and workshops to 
address human factors. The SPE Technical Report included in the list of references is one source 
for perspectives on future industry work on human factors. (Society of Petroleum Engineers - 
Technical Reports Committee 2014) Many organizations are working to integrate human factors. 
These include the National Academies, Chemical Safety Board, Ocean Energy Safety Institute, 
API, Center for Offshore Safety, military organizations, aviation industry, Chartered Institute of 
Ergonomics and Human Factors, and the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society. The range of 
activity considered for this analysis, while not a complete source of risk management activities, 
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The perspectives presented in this paper reflect, to a great extent, the results of observing 
activities over the last decade to improve levels of safety in the oil and gas industry. Thought 
leaders and “power thinkers” across the industry continue to develop valuable ideas for a step 
change in improving performance. One new paradigm is Getting to Zero Harm. (Hinton, et al. 
2018) 
Getting to zero harm converges on two primary objectives: 
o Nobody Gets Hurt 
o The CEO never gets a phone call that “a major accident just happened.” – an accident 
which destroys a major percentage of enterprise value for a larger corporation or 
bankrupts a smaller company.  
 
These two objectives are not mutually exclusive. They reinforce each other. Addressing 
occupational safety, in general, helps ensure that nobody gets hurt. Effective management of 
process safety can prevent major accidents. The perspectives offered in this paper describe a 
framework in which application of human factors concepts contributes to both of these 
objectives.  
Most companies have a well-developed Safety Management System (SMS). Continuous 
improvement is important. Periodic reviews of industry activities across the “Risk Management 
and Safety Space” by HSE leaders in individual companies help identify potential refinements 
and improvements to an existing company SMS.  
As a result of the downturn in oil prices, attention to safety is sometimes reduced. Investments in 
safety are directly related to a company’s bottom line. It is critical, even during industry 
downturns, to recognize that safety cannot be sacrificed by attempts to cut costs. The cost of 
recovering from the impact of accidents is simply too high.  
General industry dialogues emphasize the need for closer communications between corporate 
and those “at the sharp end of the spear.” This point emphasizes that the person on the front line 
must also accept ownership and responsibility for safety, especially within the realm of 
occupational safety. Whenever a serious accident or event occurs, inevitably some leader in the 
organization says, “We will put in place procedures to make sure it doesn’t happen again!”  
As Rex Tillerson put it in 2010: 
“Written rules, standards and procedures, while important and necessary, are not 
enough…A culture of safety starts with leadership, because leadership drives culture and 
culture drives behavior. Leaders influence culture by setting expectations, building 
structure, teaching others and demonstrating stewardship…For a culture of safety to 
flourish, it must be embedded throughout the organization.”  
(International Association of Oil & Gas Producers 2013) 
A key challenge in managing risk and safety performance is ensuring that safety leaders within 
the organization are able to identify potential risks for events which have not yet happened.  
The paper extracts concepts from a broad range of industry activities related to risk management 
and safety. There are no “silver bullets.” We must think in terms of range of “silver buckshot” 
from which to develop continuous improvements to safety management systems. 
Defining Human Factors and the Human Element 
According to IOGP Publication 368, 
Human factors is the term used to describe the interaction of indidivuals with each other, 
with facilities and equipment, and with management systems. This interaction is influenced 
by both the working environment and the culture of the people involved. What may be a 
good system of work in one part of an organization, may be found to be less than ideal in a 
region where culturally driven attitudes to risk taking may be significantly different. 
Human factors analysis focuses on how these interactions contribute towards the creation 
of a safe workplace. 
(International Association of Oil & Gas Producers 2005) 
Human elements regarding facilities and equipment design and ergonomics are not included in 
this paper. This paper deals primarily with the interfaces between management systems and 
people, the two elements shown in the orange and green circles of Figure 1. 
  
Figure 1: Culture and Working Environment (International Association of 
Oil & Gas Producers 2005) 
Risk Management and Human Factors – A Knowledge Base  
General Industry Sources 
Table 1 lists a range of organizations and sources of information available for consideration in 
developing risk management systems. 
Table 1 
O&G Industry Standards & Practices & 
Other Studies 
Standards & Risk Management Practices 
Outside O&G Industry 
 IADC 
 Health and Safety Executive – UK (HSE) 







 UK O&G Association 
 IOGP 
 Center for Offshore Safety 
 Chemical Safety Board 
 National Academies (NASEM) 
 Society of Petroleum Engineers 
 ISO 
o 17776 Guidelines on Tools and 
Techniques 
o 31000 RM Principles & Guidelines 
o 31010 RM – RA Techniques 
o 45001 Occupational Health Safety 
Management Systems 
 Military  
 Aviation - CRM, High Reliability 
Organizations 
 Nuclear Industry 
 Insurance Underwriters 
 Financial Sector 
 Human Factors Societies 
 
Many of the risk management and human factors concepts within these sources overlap and 
reinforce each other. A comparative reading of the various sources will provide valuable insights 
into improving an existing corporate safety management system. 
The Society of Petroleum Engineers 
Report: The Human Factor: Process Safety and Culture  
(Society of Petroleum Engineers - Technical Reports Committee 2014) 
This SPE report, based on input from 70 subject matter experts from throughout the international 
oil and gas industry, defines the scope of human factors and discusses safety culture, training and 
certification, operational control of work, decision making, and application of information 
technology (IT).  
In civil aviation, a series of major accidents led to the introduction, mandatory requirement, and 
acceptance of human factors methodologies called Crew Resource Management (CRM). 
Similarly, the nuclear power industry identified and acted upon the concept of its safety culture 
after a small number of major incidents. The challenge is whether the E&P industry can achieve 
a similar breakthrough by confronting the human factor as an issue in process safety both 
onshore and offshore. The recommended changes include moving to an organizational culture in 
which process safety is as well managed as personal safety is currently managed. 
Report: Assessing the Processes, Tools, and Value of Sharing & Learning from Offshore E&P 
Safety-Related Data 
(Society of Petroleum Engineers - Technical Reports Committee 2016) 
This SPE report provides guidance on an industry-wide safety management data sharing 
program. The overall objective of the effort is to eliminate or reduce risk of harm through 
industry sharing of data, including information on near misses. 
 
Report: Getting to Zero and Beyond: The Path Forward 
(Society of Petroleum Engineers - Technical Reports Committee 2018)  
This SPE report identifies and evaluates elements that can aid the industry in removing obstacles 
to achieving zero harm. It explores current thinking and views; incorporates experiences and 
learnings from other industries that are mature in the application of human factors; and suggests 
the next steps that will enable the oil and gas industry to meet an expectation of zero harm.  
 
Summit Paper: November 2012  
(Hudson and Thorogood 2012) 
This SPE report highlights the critical requirement for participation by individuals in achieving a 
successful safety culture. CEOs and company management alone cannot create the culture. All 
persons on the front line have a responsibility for making “safety culture” happen. See 
Figure 2 below. 
Figure 2: Human Intervention Model 
National Academy of Science Engineering and Medicine/Gulf Research Program 
Report: Strengthening the Safety Culture of the Offshore Oil and Gas Industry 
(National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine 2016)  
This 240-page report issued in 2016 provided a detailed analysis of opportunities for achieving 
an effective safety culture within the industry. According to this report, critical success factors 
for an effective safety culture in the nuclear industry include: 
o Management commitment to safety. Leadership safety values and actions, decision-
making, and respectful working environment. 
o Individual commitment to safety. Personal accountability, questioning attitude, and 
effective safety communication. 
o Management systems. Continuous learning, problem identification and resolution, 
environment for raising concerns, and work processes. 
 
Workshop: The Human Factors of Process Safety and Worker Empowerment in the Offshore Oil 
Industry 
(National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine 2018) 
This January 2018 workshop, a product of the 30-year, $500 million Gulf Research Program, 
included 80 participants representing a broad cross-section of the domestic and international 
energy industry. Topics of discussion included: 
o Differences between U.S. and international practices, both in regulatory frameworks and 
operating practices within the industry. 
o Best practices and lessons learned from other high-risk, high-reliability industries. 
o Differences resulting from union and nonunion work environments.  
o Getting CEOs engaged. 
o Perspectives from organizations outside the core oil and gas industry and especially the 
Chemical Safety Board.  
o Defining the word, empowerment. 
 
Professors Rhona Flin and Christiane Spitzmueller discussed the integration of organizational 
development and human factors concepts, as seen in Figure 3:  
 
Figure 3: The state of empowerment links organization, management, and context to safety 
behaviors. 
Bill Hoyle of the Chemical Safety Board emphasized another key point: When an audit report 
says everything is fine, “that’s a bad report.” You are getting no value from that. Reporting bad 
news is a good thing. People need to be trained to, “put bad news forward and push it up.” 
Andrew Imada, an Organizational Development Consultant and member of The National 
Academies Board on Human-Systems Integration, recommended a strong relationship between 
organizational safety culture, leadership, and voluntary safety performance. Voluntary 
performance is at the heart of empowerment. Also, empowerment requires a commitment to a 
safety culture that goes beyond compliance. 
 
Summit Paper: Safer Offshore Energy Systems 
(Society of Petroleum Engineers 2018)  
This NASEM/SPE Summit engaged a broad set of industry experts to develop ideas on areas 
where the Gulf Research Program or jointly-funded research is needed to minimize and manage 
risks for both people and the environment by minimizing the possibility of a major incident. The 
scope included include both technical and human performance opportunities. 
o Improving collaboration among industry, regulatory, and academic communities to 
advance understanding and communication about systemic risk. 
o Fundamental scientific and technological research to spur innovation aimed at reducing 
or managing risks. 
o Exploring how to create robust and resilient organizations that minimize major incidents 
with improved management of change, sim-ops management, decision support, and 
operational procedures that support safe work. 
o Identifying educational or training programs to promote a skilled and safety-oriented 
workforce and to retain that workforce through economic cycles in the oil and gas 
industry. 
The analyses and brainstorming activities were organized to span the full lifecycle of industry 
activities including: Pre-drilling, drilling, construction, and production phases of activity. The 
summit identified 144 opportunities to improve safety.  
 
Enterprise Risk Management Frameworks 
We operate in a high risk industry. Companies (and individuals) must consider their perspectives 
with regard to risk. Is it a risk averse/risk avoidance framework, or is it one of taking risks with 
appropriate risk management? The following figure provides a broad, qualitative perspective 
regarding taking or avoiding risk. A goal of zero risk is a recipe for negative returns. 
 
 
Figure 4: Strategic Positioning Risk/Reward 
With the relationship between risk and reward in mind, companies can assess whether their 
projects or activities have sufficient reward to compensate for the risk exposure. Activities in the 
upper left region provide enough reward to justify taking the risk. Activities assessed in the 
lower right region should be avoided since the return is not enough to cover the risk exposure.  
This framework should be considered from both a qualitative and quantitative perspective. The 
collective judgment of corporate leadership can provide an instinctual, qualitative perspective on 
whether to take or avoid risks. Quantitative tools can be used, when appropriate, for detailed 
evaluations of risks in any specific project or activity. 
Thinking from the framework of “High Reliability Organizations” is critical. The objective is not 
to get to zero risk. The energy industry requires taking calculated risks, managed effectivly. 
The industry is increasing emphasis on integrating knowledge and perspectives from outside the 
core oil and gas industry.  
In an article published in Harvard Business Review, Nassim Taleb, author of the book, The Black 
Swan, discusses risk management issues relevant to the oil and gas industry and identifies 
additional ideas worth considering. “Black Swan events are almost impossible to predict. Instead 
of perpetuating the illusion that we can anticipate the future, risk management should try to 
reduce the impact of the threats we don’t understand.” (Taleb, Goldstein and Spitznagel 2009)  
He continues on to detail six mistakes executives make in risk management: 
1. We think we can manage risk by predicting extreme events. 
2. We are convinced that studying the past will help us manage risks. 
3. We don’t listen to advice about what we shouldn’t do. 
4. We assume that risk can be measured by standard deviation. 
5. We don’t appreciate that what is mathematically equivalent is not psychologically so. 
6. We are taught that efficiency and maximizing shareholder value do not tolerate 
redundancy. 
It is important to emphasize how to manage low probability, high impact events. 
 
API RP 75 - Framework for the Safety Management System 
API is updating Recommended Practice 75, Recommended Practice for Development of a Safety 
and Environmental Management Program for Offshore Operations and Facilities. The release of 
the updated RP 75 is scheduled for year-end 2018. The preamble for this update states: 
This document is intended to describe a performance-based management system focusing 
on the purpose and expectations for each element of a safety and environmental 
management systems (SEMS). It is not intended to be prescriptive in defining how to 
achieve the purpose and expectations of each element; rather, it allows flexibility 
appropriate to the size, scope, and risk of a company's assets and operations. 
This revised RP 75 addresses the human element only in general terms. Applying and integrating 
the “human element” or “human factors” within the overall framework of the risk management 
system can be challenging. Where does the human element fit in? Generally everywhere. A 
keyword search of the term, human, within the draft update to API RP 75 shows that the term 
appears only a few times.  
The following is a list of the required elements of an SMS in the updated RP75. 
1. General  
2. Safety & Environmental 
3. Hazards Analysis 
4. MOC  
5. Operating Procedures  
6. Safe Work Practices  
7. Training  
8. Mechanical Integrity  
9. Pre-Startup Review  
10. Emergency Response  
11. Incident Investigation 
12. Auditing 
13. Records & Documentation 
14. Stop Work Authority (SWA) 
15. Ultimate Work Authority (UWA) 
16. Employee Participation Program (EPP) 
17. Reporting Unsafe Working Conditions 
 
  
Guidance on human performance which impacts most of the elements within the SMS is 
included in the draft document under Section 3.2.4, Human Performance: 
Achieving effective human performance results from the systematic application of 
knowledge and learnings to improve the interactions of individuals with each other, 
equipment, and systems. The SEMS influences human performance by incorporating the 
following concepts: 
a. Leadership Response: Leaders commit to responding to failures and successess in a 
way that improves human and team performance.  
b. Resilient Design: Systems are designed to account for the variability and error-likely 
situations that occur in the interactions of individuals with each other, equipment, and 
systems. 
c. Human Feedback: It is recognized that human input and adaptability enables effective 
HSSE performance and continual improvement in SEMS. 
d. Functionality: An effective SEMS considers human factors, the end user, the interfaces, 
the work, and the decision-making processes in the design, implementation, and 
maintenance of the management system. 
Within this high-level framework for a performance-based SMS as defined by API RP 75, 
organizations have significant flexibility regarding which potential standards or practices to use 
in developing an SMS. The following progression suggests one potential framework which relies 
heavily on IOGP and ISO standards. This framework also recommends expanding an SMS 
which meets the minimum regulatory requirements to an enterprise risk management framework 
with performance goals beyond compliance.  Note: Insert at right in figure below from IOGP. 
The Framework 
+ API RP75 
 
The Knowledge Base (partial list) 
+ IOGP publications 
+ ISO portfolio of risk management publications 
 




+ Enterprise Risk Management 
+Generative Performance 
Figure 5 (International Association of Oil and Gas Producers 2010) 
The Risk Matrix – A Key Tool 
The paper, Anatomy of the Risk Matrix, (Van Scyoc and Hopkins 2012) provides an excellent 
framework for developing a risk matrix and is suggested as one of the best starting points for 
developing an overall assessment of corporate enterprise risk. This paper provides significant 
insights and perspectives on risk tolerance, the balance between intuitive and quantitative 
approaches, key pitfalls in developing and applying risk matrices, the level of granularity 
appropriate in a risk matrix based on the size of the corporation, and emphasis on analyzing risks 
with potential major impact on enterprise value. 
 
Figure 6: Generic Risk Matrix based on ISO 17776 
Rigorous application of this risk matrix provides the basis for: 
o Identifying and prioritizing the hazards across the spectrum from risks to major enterprise 
value to less serious risks. 
o Analyzing the impact of the hazards with and without mitigation. 
o Selecting the critical safety activities for high priority treatment.  
o Selecting and managing barriers to mitigate the risks including procedures, generally 
within the framework of a “bowtie.” 
 
Extreme Operational Excellence 
Achieving compliance with procedures is one of the critical success factors in preventing 
accidents. How can an organization ensure compliance with procedures? High reliability 
organizations such as the nuclear submarine service have experienced proven success.  
  
Trevor Kletz, author of the book, What Went Wrong, writes:  
The 1988 explosion and fire on the Piper Alpha oil platform in the North Sea, which killed 
163 people, was also caused by poor isolation. A pump relief valve was removed for 
overhaul and the open end blanked. Another shift, not knowing that the relief valve was 
missing, started up the pump. The blank was probably not tight, and light oil leaked past it 
and exploded in the confined processing area. The official report concluded “that the 
operating staff had no commitment to working to the written procedure; and that the 
procedure was knowingly and flagrantly disregarded.” The loss of life was greater on 
Piper Alpha than on the other two incidents because oil platforms are very congested and 
escape is difficult. 
(Kletz 2009) 
Conclusions in the Piper Alpha Accident Report by Lord Cullen included: “The operating staff 
had no commitment to working to the written procedure; and … the procedure was 
knowingly and flagrantly disregarded.” 
Problems with procedures are linked to numerous incidents and are frequently cited as one of the 
causes of major accidents. Ineffective management of procedures has not only contributed to 
disasters such as Bhopal, Piper Alpha, Exxon Valdez, and Bp Texas City, but also to most 
accidents which have resulted in fatalities and personal injuries. The main causes are too much 
reliance placed on procedures to control risk; a failure to follow safe working procedures; or the 
use of inadequate procedures. 
Lessons from Bp Texas City (U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board 2005): 
o A work environment that encouraged operations personnel to deviate from procedure. 
o Acceptance of procedural deviations during past startups.  
o Failure to ensure the procedures remained up-to-date and accurate. 
o Management did not ensure that unit operational problems were corrected over time, 
allowing operators to deviate from established procedures. 
o The startup procedure lacked sufficient instructions for the Console Operator to safely 
and successfully start up the unit. 
 
Risk management systems must clarify the difference between empowering and engaging all 
workers so that the organization is able to achieve operational discipline. Empowering workers 
does not mean companies should allow workers to choose which procedures to follow and which 
not to follow.  
Multiple layers of protection are needed against human error. The following are just a few 
protections: 
o Process engineering design 
o Basic controls and alarms 
o Operational excellence ownership/supervision 
o Critical alarms and manual intervention 
o Advanced controllers and automatic action (SIS or ESD) 
o Physical protection (relief devices, dikes, or blast areas)  
o Plant emergency response to community emergency response 
o Procedures 
 
Experience has proven that when people think of a production platform or process facility, they 
tend to focus on the equipment—the vessels, pumps, compressors, instrumentation, and controls. 
EPC firms, as well as the Owners, often fail to conisder the entire system, particularly the end 
users, the people who operate and maintain the facility. These people will have different 
competencies, training, and experiences, and will perform differently under various operating 
conditions, organizational structures, equipment configurations, and work scenarios. 
The probability that the total system will perform correctly after it is commissioned is the 
probability that the hardware/software will perform as designed, times the probability that the 
operating environment will not degrade the system operation, times the probability that the end 
user will perform correctly. 
By defining the total system this way, human performance is identified as a component of the 
system. By increasing the probability that operators and maintenance technicians can perform 
tasks effectively in the appropriate environment, the total system performance will increase 
significantly. 
Of all the protections a company can employ, procedures are critical to operational excellence. 
Procedures, including work instructions, job aids, etc., are agreed safe and best ways of doing 
things. They usually consist of prerequisites, safety precautions, workflow sequences, action 
item series, consequences of deviation, and related information needed to carry out tasks safely. 
Procedures may include flowcharts, decision trees, step-by-step instructions, checklists, 
diagrams, and other types of job aids.  
Key principles in procedure design: 
o Risk assessment should clearly establish when procedures are an appropriate control 
measure. The results of the risk assessment should inform development of the procedure. 
o In O&G, for a production platform or a process unit to be operated in a safe manner, a 
hazard analysis and the pre-startup review ensure that provisions made in final design and 
subsequent modifications are reflected in system operating limits. A major contributor to 
compliance with system operating limits is made by the development and use of 
operating and maintenance procedures. 
o Consider the links between procedures and competency—they should support each other 
(e.g., on-the-job competency would include training on frequent, important, and critical 
procedures). Procedures do not replace competency. Procedures do not replace training. 
o Have a system for managing procedures—job task analysis (e.g., how to decide which 
tasks need procedures based on frequency, importance, and difficulty of the task to be 
performed, how these procedures are developed, complied with, and reviewed/updated).  
o Use a format, style, and level of detail appropriate to the user, task, and consequences of 
failure. Procedures should be fit for purpose. One size does not fit all. Support 
compliance with procedures through user involvement and by designing the task, job, 
environment, equipment, etc. 
  
The exact strategy to reduce non-compliance will depend to a large extent on the reasons why 
procedures are not followed in the first place, for example: 
o If not following a procedure or instruction has become the normal way of behaving 
within a facility, employees see little value in them. Consider explaining the reasons 
behind the procedure; change the procedure if it becomes inappropriate; 
or consider rationalizing work systems to reduce the number of unnecessary rules. If the 
rule is critical, then increase the probability of detection. 
o If an instruction is impossible or extremely difficult to work in a particular situation (e.g., 
conflicting requirements or physically impossible to perform the activities in the 
specified manner), then improve job design, the human-machine interface, and 
the working conditions; implement a suitable reporting system; and provide more 
appropriate supervision. 
 
The following will help ensure procedures more likely to be used: 
o Ensure the “right” way to do the job requires less time and effort. Eliminate tendencies to 
take shortcuts. 
o Use a procedure format that suits the task and the end user (e.g., checklist, flowchart, 
diagram, decision-aid, charts, photos). 
o Involve end users in the development and implementation of the procedures (to help 
close the gap between “work as engineered” and “work as done”). 
o Design the task, job, environment, equipment, etc. to support the end user in following 
the procedures. Design the job so that the correct procedure is hard to avoid. 
o Balance the level of detail in procedures with the experience and competence of the end 
user. Generally, procedures should be written for a “qualified” operator or technician. 
 
As noted in the recent Gulf Research Program workshop summary, “Procedures have to be 
appropriate for the context in which they are being used, and employees need to know when they 
can and cannot follow them based on the situation.” (National Academies of Sciences, 
Engineering, and Medicine 2018).  Later in the report it is noted that it is important that 
employees, “should be empowered to slow down, shut down, stabilize, and get the right 
procedure before advancing” in any given situation. 
Barrier Management 
IOGP defines a barrier as, “A risk control that seeks to prevent unintended events from 
occurring, or prevent escalation of events into incidents with harmful consequences.” 
(International Association of Oil and Gas Producers 2014) 
During the recent updates to API RP 75 and within the Human Element Working Group there 
was significant debate and discussion as to whether the human element should be considered a 
barrier within an overall risk management system. The following comments and clarifications, 
based in part on IOGP Report 456, were discussed: 
Human barriers rely on the actions of people capable of carrying out activities designed to 
respond and act to manage the potential cause or threat of an event. Human barriers 
include: 
o Operating in accordance with procedures 
o Surveillance, operator rounds, and routine inspection 
o Authorization of temporary or mobile equipment 
o Acceptance of handover or restart of facilities and equipment 
o Response to process alarm and upset conditions (e.g., outside safe operating envelope) 
o Response to emergencies 
 
Human barriers require a set of individual and collective behaviors that ensure the 
barriers remain effective (e.g., not short-cutting procedures, honoring the full Management 
of Change process, and staying within the safe operating envelopes). Sometimes these 
behaviors are referred to as ‘operating discipline.’ Without these desired behaviors, 
resilience of human barriers will be very low. Strong, energetic and consistent leadership 
will always be required to maintain acceptable human barrier health. 
(International Association of Oil and Gas Producers 2011) 
For safety critical activities, a framework such as this is essential to reduce the possibility of 
major accidents to the lowest possible levels. In a recent white paper published in December 
2016, the Chartered Institute of Ergonomics and Human Factors details rigorous ways to apply 
human factors in barrier management with emphasis on achieving resilience in the barriers. 
(Chartered Institute of Ergonomics & Human Factors n.d.) See the following figure: 
 
 
Figure 7: A Layered Bowtie - Integrating the Human Element into Barrier Management  
HSE professionals and technical and operational managers are encouraged to use the concepts, 
guidelines, and detailed recommendations in this white paper as a basis for integrating the human 
element as one of the key barriers in a risk management system. 
  
Perspectives on Organizational Development 
Organizational development is a critical activity impacting all the key elements of a successful 
enterprise risk management structure. It is not simply a background activity to be “handled by 
human relations.” Executive leadership should be directly involved in and lead activities in 
organizational development.  
The "mental model” in Figure 8 depicts Organizational Development as an overarching activity 
essential to tie together the key elements of occupational safety, process safety, and human 
factors.  
Figure 8: Expanding Risk and Safety to a Broader Framework of Organizational Development 
of High Reliability Organizations (Grossweiler 2015)  
Two thought leaders with major impact and influence on organizational development concepts 
over the last several decades were Peter Drucker and Edward Deming. 
Drucker noted that a company culture can prevent attempts to create or enforce a strategy that is 
incompatible with an existing culture. Culture must be driven by corporate leadership. It is a 
critical success factor for successful management of enterprise risk. 
Deming was noted for advancing concepts for measuring performance as a key element in 
improving performance and a framework for continuous improvement in enterprise performance. 
 
Leadership and Safety Culture 
Leadership has many different definitions! It is not be necessary or possible to get a consensus 
definition of leadership or safety culture. Reading biographies of several famous leaders helps 
develop a broad perspective on leadership.  
General Kelly, The Secretary, Department of Homeland Security gave two pieces of advice on 
leadership in a keynote address at the USCG Academy graduation in May 2017: 
Take care of your people. Train them. Mentor them. Defend them. They will do anything 
you ask them to do. They’ll show up to work on time. They will put their lives at risk, on the 
high seas interdicting drugs in tons, dealing with the most dangerous men on the planet, or 
they would jump out of a helicopter in the middle of the night into raging seas to save 
someone’s life. All you have to do is lead them. 
Tell the truth. Tell the truth to your seniors even though it is uncomfortable, even though 
they may not want to hear it. They deserve that. 
(U.S. Department of Homeland Security 2017) 
 
The point with regard to “truth” noted by some industry leaders, i.e. “An audit which does not 
find something which can be improved concerning actionable aspects is not a good audit.” is 
worth emphasizing. Leaders expect and accept information critical to improving operations. 
Achieving “safety culture” is also challenging. In some organizations, when the “safety 
policeman/woman” is present (this could be an HSE safety representative), everyone acts in the 
right way and does the right thing. As soon as the safety policeman/woman leaves, performance 
returns to “business as usual.”  
In the SPE Distinguished Lecturer Program, Kenneth E. Arnold outlined the following activities 
that help build a culture of safety: 
From an organizational level there must be: 
o Mechanisms establishing structure and control – To specify what is needed to operate 
safely and check that it is being done. 
o Actions establishing safety norms – To encourage people to act properly even when no 
one is looking or when it is not in their immediate best interest. 
o  
From an individual perspective there must be: 
o Mechanisms establishing competency – Knowledge and ability of the structure, control, 
and behavioral norms. 
o Actions establishing motivation – So a totally selfish person would act in accordance 




“Safety culture is doing the right thing, even when nobody is watching.” 
Over the last decade, several sources, including IOGP, have introduced the characterization of 
performance within an organization along the progression of: Pathological, Reactive, 
Calculative, Proactive, and Generative Performance. Advancing enterprise performance on this 
path requires a strong contribution from organizational development. 
IOGP 435 provides a framework within which a company can assess the overall quality and 
effectiveness of its risk management system. Organizations should strive to climb the ladder all 
the way up from pathological to generative performance. 
 
Path to Generative Performance – A Learning Organization. 
The matrix in the table below was presented in the September 2015 SPE webinar. A framework 
such as this suggests approaches for a Learning Organization to ensure that persons at all levels 
throughout the organization have the appropriate background and perspective for managing risk 
and safety. Most organizations realize that appropriate training should be provided for front line 
workers. This framework outlines levels of education and training for everyone throughout the 
organization, including executive level management. 
 
Generative organizations have a high degree of self-sufficiency and strive to 
understand their entire operating environment. Tools that are chosen and used 
by the whole organization are preferred. Mandatory tools may be 
counterproductive, suggesting lack of trust. Everyone feels free to highlight 
both real and potential issues. Workers feel empowered to resolve HSE issues, 
and leaders provide the support needed. 
Getting beyond compliance and to . Generative performance. The investment 
in improvement in safety performance is accretive to the bottom line. 
Pathological organizations believe that individuals, typically at lower levels, 
cause accidents. They implement only what is mandatory, including required 
checks and audits. Most HSE tools are ineffective at this level, as HSE is 
considered an obstacle to operations. Pathological organizations respond to 
clear regulatory requirements, if enforced, and implement HSE programs only 
as needed to avoid prosecution. As individuals are generally blamed for 
incidents, pools dealing with management system issues are unlikely to be 
adopted. 
Figure 9 (International Association of Oil and Gas Producers 2010) 
Activities at executive and senior management levels in a Learning Organization might include 
corporate retreats, industry seminars, and symposia. Emphasis would be on major enterprise 
risks, leadership development, and achieving commitment to corporate vision. Several leading 
business schools provide seminars on these topics. 
Learning activities for operating management might include similar activities but with more 
specific training directly related to a persons current operational positions and responsibilities. 
The HSE professionals continue to participate in industry sessions to maintain a “state of the art” 
competency of best practices in Occupational Safety and Process Safety. 
 
Recommendations 
Most companies already have safety management systems in place and should strive for 
continuous improvement. The approaches for continuous improvement established by Charles 
Deming in the 1990s are still relevant today. 
Companies should strive for an appropriate balance between managing risks to personal safety 
and preventing major disasters. Within corporate risk management, companies should 
concentrate on the major risks. Personal safety in accordance with well-established corporate and 
industry guidelines should be the primary responsibility of all individuals throughout the 
organization. 
Companies should set a goal of Beyond Compliance and Zero Harm for the organization. IOGP 
Report 435 provides a roadmap for categorizing and assessing an organization’s level of 
performance across all elements of operations and risk management. Organizations performing at 
Figure 10: Potential Framework of Organizational Development and CRM Education and Training for a Learning Organization 
(Grossweiler 2015) 
the “Generative” level set performance targets beyond compliance. The SPE Technical Report, 
Getting to Zero and Beyond, reinforces this goal. 
Continuing efforts to improve leadership or safety culture are important. However, a consensus 
on approaches to these concepts applicable to all companies across the industry is not possible or 
necessary. Ultimately, leadership is taking care of your people and safety culture is doing the 
right thing when no one is watching. 
 
Conclusions 
The discussions in this paper combine: 
1. An overview of industry and regulatory activity over the last decade to improve risk 
management and safety performance, and 
2. An outline of ideas for increasing emphasis on human factors to improve safety 
performance in the future. 
The industry is strong in addressing occupational safety and process safety. The biggest 
improvements in managing risk can come from comprehensive approaches to applying 
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